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LEGAL THEORY
"I'LL SELL IT TO YOU AT COST": LEGAL
METHODS TO PROMOTE RETAIL
MARKUP DISCLOSURE
Ian Ayres*
and F. Clayton Miller**
In today's marketplace, retailers provide consumers with a wealth of
information about the prices, qualities, and uses of their products. Con-
spicuously absent, however, is information about the retailer's cost or
markup.1 Retail sellers are generally unwilling to tell a buyer the whole-
sale cost of the goods they sell. To be sure, there are counter-examples.
Some car dealers, for instance, promise to sell their cars for "$1 over
dealer's cost."' 2 Yet, because such representations are almost certainly
false,3 these very examples serve only to highlight the problem. In a lim-
ited number of markets, consumers value cost information but the com-
petitive market process does not provide it in any credible fashion.
This Article examines whether consumer protection laws should be
used to promote markup disclosure. Our goals are (1) to identify the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., J.D., Yale University; Ph.D.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
** Associate, Sherman and Sterling. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Northwestern
University.
I The markup is the difference between retail price and retail cost. As discussed in note 98,
infra, retail cost could properly be defined to include various overhead expenses, but as used here
and throughout the rest of the Article, retail cost refers only to the marginal cost of the good, as
represented by the per unit amount paid by the retailer to the manufacturer. See also infra note 112
(discussion of rebates).
The Lerner index of market power can also be calculated from the retail price and marginal cost
data. The index is defined as the price of the good the firm produces less the marginal cost of that
good divided by the price of that good, [(P-MC)/P]. The Lerner index is used in some economic
models as a measure of market power. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981); see also Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power, 1 REv. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
2 See, eg., Chicago Tribune, Sept. 1, 1988, § 6, at 21, col. 1 (advertisement for Laurel Mazda-
Volkswagen); see also DISCOVERY, June 1988, at 85 ("We plan to Lose Money on this Ofier")
(advertisement).
3 For empirical evidence of car dealer cost misrepresentation, see infra note 39 and accompany-
ing text.
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markets in which consumers will most value markup information; (2) to
show how markup competition could increase equity and efficiency by
decreasing retail price dispersion and by substituting for consumer
search; and (3) to suggest why competitive markets might not supply the
information that consumers and society value.
Even if we achieve these goals, it does not necessarily follow that the
government should intervene. Government intervention in even ineffi-
cient markets is only rationally justified if it does more good than harm.
Keeping this premise in mind, we explore a range of possible government
interventions and assess the costs and benefits of supplementing or dis-
placing market forces. We prefer the rifle to the shotgun. Our policy
proposals are aimed at a small, but significant, group of retail markets
where we believe some forms of government intervention are justified.
The retail car market serves as a paradigmatic example for many of
our theories.4 We suggest that buying a new car would be easier and
more equitable in a world where retailers revealed their true costs. Con-
sumers armed with information about the retailer's markup would not
need to search at as many dealerships-for the simple reason that con-
sumers would have a much better idea when they were getting a good
deal. Markup information can thus serve as a dramatic substitute for
consumer search.5 We also suggest that markup revelation would trun-
cate the bargaining process at each dealership. The possibility of hood-
winking uninformed buyers into purchasing at a high markup would
diminish as the excessive profits would be directly revealed. There would
most likely be fewer rounds of bargaining and less price dispersion in the
final offers. Finally, we imagine that retailers might begin to compete on
the basis of markups. Retailers might advertise not to sell cars above a
certain markup level.6 The dual burden of this Article is to explain how
this "kinder, gentler" equilibrium could exist, and why market forces
have failed to create it.
In Section I we discuss the evolution of the legal attitudes toward
cost disclosure, beginning with the common law's indifference to inten-
tional misrepresentation of seller's cost (while noting the increasing legal
recognition of its relevance to informed consumer choice). Section II
identifies the market conditions that make cost or markup disclosure rel-
4 Even if our proposal was limited exclusively to new car sales it would still merit the effort.
More than $100 billion was spent on new cars in America in 1986. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 426 (1989) (chart No. 693). New car purchases represent the largest consumer
investment for most U.S. citizens besides buying a house. Id.
5 Search substitutes and search complements reduce the cost of consumer search by making
consumer product search more efficient. See Grady, Regulating Information: Advertising Overview,
in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAU-
CRATIC BEHAVIOR 222 (R. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981).
6 The intricacies of implementing mandated disclosure of the retail markup, including the diffi-
culties of handling trade-ins and manufacturer rebates to the dealerships, are discussed in notes 113-
117, infra.
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evant to buyers. In "thick" markets, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change, current price quotations are cheaply available, making seller cost
immaterial. In "thin" markets, however, where this information is not
so easily acquired, consumers may rationally value markup information.
Section III explains why retail competition fails to provide this informa-
tion about seller cost. Focusing on these sources of market failure, the
fourth and final Section examines a range of ways that government might
intervene to promote cost disclosure-including increased enforcement
of prohibitions against markup misrepresentations, development of ac-
counting standards to allow retailers to speak more credibly about their
costs, and implementation of guidelines mandating disclosure of the re-
tailer's costs or markups in appropriate markets.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The common law has traditionally been reluctant to penalize sellers
for misrepresenting their costs. Even as recently as the first half of this
century, a seller's cost misrepresentation was not, standing by itself, ac-
tionable as a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact.7 For exam-
ple, in Furrow v. 1st National Bank of Oklahoma City,8 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court refused to allow a buyer to sue for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation when the seller had misrepresented what the land had cost. In
that case, "misrepresentation by the seller as to both the value of the
property to the plaintiffs and the amount paid by the defendants was not
sufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury." 9
Other jurisdictions have similarly held that the misrepresentation of
seller's cost was immaterial to the current valuation of property, or that
the buyer did not in fact rely on the misrepresentation. 10 These decisions
7 See, eg., Steiner v. Hughes, 172 Okla. 268, 271-72, 44 P.2d 857, 860-61 (1935) (misrepresent-
ing cost of stock to the seller is irrelevant, standing alone, and does not constitute fraudulent misrep-
resentation); Rogers v. Brummett, 92 Okla. 216,219-20, 220 P. 362, 366 (1923) (false statement as to
the value of the property, standing alone, is not actionable as fraud, though "[i]f the false statement
as to the value of the property is one act of a series of fraudulent acts" designed to induce the
purchaser to buy, "the false statements as to the value will be considered as one of the elements to
actionable fraud"); see also Hawk v. Brownell, 120 Ill. 161, 163-64, 11 N.E. 416, 416-17 (1887)
(absent a fiduciary or similar relationship between buyer and seller, the misrepresentation of original
cost to seller is not by itself fraudulent); Beare v. Wright, 14 N.D. 26, 37, 103 N.W. 632, 636 (1905)
(cost misrepresentation does not constitute actionable fraud in the absence of fiduciary duty between
the parties or other circumstances that give rise to an agreement that the cost should determine the
price of the contract); Robinson v. Phegley, 84 Or. 124, 129, 163 P. 1166, 1167 (1917) (misrepresen-
tation as to the value of claims against a certain property was immaterial).
8 133 Okla. 137, 139-40, 271 P. 632, 634 (1928) (misrepresentation of seller's cost was not
relevant as it had no material bearing on the current value of the property).
9 Id.
10 See, eg., Hawk, 120 Ill. at 161, 11 N.E. at 416 (misrepresentation about cost does not consti-
tute fraud unless a fiduciary relationship exists between buyer and seller); Steiner, 172 Okla. at 270,
44 P.2d at 860 (statements made about the original cost of the stock to the seller regarded "as pure
'dealer's talk' "; court did not find "sufficient materiality, or proof of reliance upon them. ..");
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were premised on the proposition that buyer reliance on the seller's
purported cost in figuring the price she was willing to pay was unreason-
able absent something more specifically fraudulent.I1  These jurisdictions
placed the burden on the buyer to determine independently the value of
the property at the time of the sale. For example, in McCaw v.
O'Malley,12 the Missouri Supreme Court denied a buyer's fraud claim
when a seller had misrepresented his cost in a real estate transaction:
The mere statement by the vendor of what an article cost him would not be
regarded as a matter on which a vendee should rely where, as here, the
vendee had an unrestricted opportunity to learn the actual value of the
property and where, as here, the vendee actually undertook to ascertain
such value. 13
By denying buyers an action of fraud for a seller's misrepresentation
of cost, the common law seriously undermined the ability of buyers to
acquire reliable cost information. That is, the reliability of any cost rep-
resentation would have been substantially discounted by buyers, because
under the common law sellers had no legal obligation to tell the truth. 14
Moreover, the McCaw standard explicitly precluded buyers from relying
on the seller's cost information as a substitute for independently search-
ing out the property's current value. If the buyer had "an unrestricted
opportunity to learn the actual value of the property" independently, she
could not rely on the seller's cost as a search substitute.
This independent valuation method held sway until the 1950s,
particularly in the Western states where it was tied to the long-standing
Rogers, 92 Okla. at 216, 220 P. at 362 (mere statements as to what the property is worth, whether
reflective of cost or some subjective value, not actionable as fraud unless there are other actions that
mislead the buyer and would reasonably require him to base his decision on the seller's opinion or
statements); Bryant v. Stohn, 260 S.W.2d 77, 82-83 (rex. Civ. App. 1953) (cost misrepresentation
not actionable unless the price paid by the vendee was specifically tied to the misrepresented cost).
I See, e.g., Furrow v. 1st Nat'l Bank of Oklahoma City, 133 Okla. 137, 139-40, 271 P. 632, 634
(1928) (misrepresentation by the seller as to the value of the property to the plaintiffs and the
amount paid by the defendants was not sufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury as a question of
law); Robinson, 84 Or. at 129, 163 P. at 1168 (buyer alleged purchase made in reliance on the
defendant's representations of his cost; court held that "[i]t is not enough that the misrepresentations
of a vendor furnishes the vendee with a motive to buy"); see also D.C. Land & Bldg. Co. v. McIner-
ney, 64 F.2d 554, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (misrepresentation of cost did not constitute fraud; inappro-
priate for buyer to base his judgment solely on that information); Orlan v. Laederich, 338 Mo. 783,
793-94, 92 S.W.2d 190, 196 (1936) ("[t]he exercise of common sense, self-reliance, and ordinary
diligence and prudence is to be expected in... transactions between adults, and indolence, listless-
ness, indifference, and unwarranted credulity should not be encouraged."); McCaw v. O'Malley, 298
Mo. 401, 415, 249 S.W. 41, 45 (1923) (purchaser should not ordinarily rely upon representations of
cost particularly when purchaser had "an opportunity to determine value.").
12 298 Mo. at 401, 249 S.W. at 45 (1923).
13 Id. at 401, 249 S.W. at 45; see also Orlan v. Laederich, 338 Mo. 783, 793-94, 92 S.W.2d 190,
197 (1936) (buyer had ample opportunity to inspect property and ascertain value).
14 Of course, the sellers may have had reputational or ethical incentives to tell the truth, even
without the potential of fraud actions.
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doctrine of "caveat emptor."1 5 Since that time, however, several jurisdic-
tions have adopted a broader concept of materiality and reasonableness
of reliance.16 Some courts have begun now to infer reasonable reliance
by the buyer on a seller's representation of cost. 17 Yet, the narrow com-
mon-law rules from cases like Furrow and McCaw have not been over-
ruled and show surprising resiliency. For example, a Missouri appellate
court, as recently as 1986, reaffirmed the McCaw holding when it refused
to allow plaintiffs to rescind a real estate contract even though the de-
fendant admitted to overstating his cost by $10,000.18
While the common law has only grudgingly started to accept the
relevancy of seller's costs to buyers, federal and state regulations have
begun to prohibit cost misrepresentation and, in a few areas, actually
mandate partial cost revelation. The Federal Trade Commission has, for
example, promulgated a set of Guidelines Against Deceptive Pricing,19
which strictly limits the representations individual sellers may make con-
cerning the cost of the goods: "[R]etailers should not advertise a retail
price as a 'wholesale' price. They should not represent that they are sell-
ing at 'factory' prices when they are not selling at the prices paid by those
purchasing directly from the manufacturer. ' ' 20 Additionally, the Guide-
lines limit advertising of the seller's cost as below or equal to "invoice" or
"market" cost without proper justification. The Guidelines clearly repre-
15 See, eg., Bryant v. Stohn, 260 S.W.2d 77, 82-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (vendor's misrepresen-
tation of rents to be recovered from purchased land was not actionable fraud); see also Steiner v.
Hughes, 172 Oki. 286, 44 P.2d 857 (1935).
16 See, eg., Vertes v. GAC Properties, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 256, 260 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (To consti-
tute "actionable fraud," it must appear that the defendant made a material misrepresentation; that it
was false; that when he made it he knew it was false, or made it recklessly without knowledge of its
truth as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted on by the
plaintiff; that plaintiff acted in reliance on it; and that the plaintiff was actually injured.).
17 FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1337 (10th Cir. 1987) (misrepresentations by bank officers
were actionable; plaintiff was reasonable in assessing the value of the property on the basis of the
money the bank was willing to let the plaintiff secure and that due to the uncertain value of the
property the bank's valuation was as good as any other valuation available to the plaintiff); see also
Alexander v. Sagehorn, 600 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Mo. CL App. 1980) (fraud claim permitted when wife
relied on husband's misrepresentation of property value in divorce settlement); Rimling v. Scherper,
206 Wis. 532, 545, 240 N.W. 159, 164 (1932) (misrepresentations "well calculated to induce anyone
intending to purchase not to make direct inquiry of the owners"; plaintiff thus reasonably relied on
the seller's statements).
18 Misskelly v. Rogers, 721 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (court found that the plaintiffs
investigated the property prior to purchase and as such it was unreasonable for them to rely on the
seller's representation of cost as a basis for a value judgment); see also Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329
(federal court at pains to distinguish prior state precedent).
19 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1989) [hereinafter Guidelines].
20 Id at § 233.5 (1989). Although the FTC has not to date brought suit claiming that a misrep-
resentation of seller's cost is an unfair trade practice, the Guidelines are explicitly intended to be read
broadly: "The practices covered in the provisions set forth above represent the most frequently
employed forms of bargain advertising. However, there are many variations which appear from time
to time and which are, in the main, controlled by the same general principles." Id.
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sent an attempt to protect consumer welfare by prohibiting cost misrep-
resentations by sellers.
More generally, the Guidelines prohibit sellers from misrepresenting
nonsale prices. For example, it would be deceptive to advertise: "Wid-
gets, normally $20 a bunch, now only $12" if the normal (nonsale) wid-
get price was actually less than $20. The ultimate question for the
consumer is whether the widget is worth $12.21 The motive underlying
the "was $20, now $12" deception is that consumers are more likely to
think a widget is worth $12 if they hear that it is regularly sold for $20
instead of for, say, $15. The Guidelines attempt to prohibit sellers from
giving false indirect indicators of widget value in two distinct ways. The
deceptive sale rules prohibit sellers from overstating the size of the sale
discount ("up to 50% off"); the deceptive cost rules--operating at a dif-
ferent margin-prohibit sellers from understating the true markup
("only 5% over our cost"). As illustrated in Figure 1, the deceptive cost
and markup rules attempt to do from below what the deceptive sale and
discount rules try to do from above. Both rules implicitly recognize that
consumers may misjudge whether the product is worth the current price
if they are given benchmarks of false, nonsale prices or false seller costs.
The rules express the belief that inflated discount or deflated markup
claims may mislead some consumers into making mistaken purchases.
21 See infra note 44 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the determinants of con-
sumer choice.
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PNS = Non-sale (normal) Widget Price
Ps = Sale (current) Widget Price
C = Seller Cost
M = Total Market = Ps -C
D = Total Discount = PNS - PS
Ps - C
m -=Percentage Markup - C
Ps
d = Percentage Discount - PNS
Most states have passed similar unfair trade practices acts or con-
sumer protection statutes to address seller misrepresentation.22 These
statutes generally prohibit any misrepresentation that has "a tendency to
mislead."' 23 A typical example of this type of statutory provision that
draws upon the consensus of state law is found in the District of Colum-
bia's Unfair Trade Practices statute.24 Sections 28-3904(e) and (j) make
22 See, eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 1 (West 1989).
23 See generally supra note 22, for the language in the state statutes noted previously.
24 D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (1989).
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it unlawful for sellers to:
(e) misrepresent as to a material fact which has a tendency to mislead;...
or
(j) make false or misleading representations of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions, or the price in comparison
to the price of competitors or one's own price at a past or future time.2 5
These kinds of statutes are frequently used to attack a broad range of
seller misrepresentations.2 6 Like the FTC's Guidelines, state statutes sig-
nificantly restrict the de jure right of sellers to misrepresent their costs or
markup.
In a handful of settings, state and federal regulations even mandate
certain types of cost disclosure. For example, the Automobile Informa-
tion Disclosure Act 27 mandates that retailers disclose their transporta-
tion, shipping, and delivery costs. 28 In the corporate context, Congress
has empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission to require, via
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 494 A.2d 804 (1985) (brought under New
Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to :8-38 (West 1989)); Guste v. Crossroads
Gallery Inc., 357 So. 2d 1381 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (brought under Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices
in Consumer Protection Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:1401-:1418 (West 1987)); F. Ray Moore Oil
Co. v. State, 80 N.C. App. 139, 341 S.E.2d 371 (1986) (brought under North Carolina's Consumer
Protection Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1988)), review denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 139
(1986). See generally Annotation, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practice and Con-
sumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3D 449 (1979 & Supp. 1989) (more complete listing of similar cases
arising under the several state consumer protection statutes).
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1233 (1988).
28 The Automobile Information Disclosure Act (or the "Act") requires that:
Every manufacturer of new automobiles distributed in commerce shall... securely affix to the
windshield...
(f) the following information:
(1) the retail price of such automobile suggested by the manufacturer;
(2) the retail delivered price suggested by the manufacturer for each accessory or item of
optional equipment, physically attached to such automobile at the time of its delivery to such
dealer, which is not included within the price of such automobile as stated pursuant to para-
graph (1);
(3) the amount charged, if any, to such dealer for the transportation of such automobile to
the location at which it is delivered to such dealer;
(4) the total of the amounts specified pursuant to paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
15 U.S.C. § 1232 (1988).
The Act carries with it fines of up to $1000 for each offense. By mandating disclosure, Congress
hoped to deter dishonest and confusing marketing strategies:
Recently, the new car dealers have been plagued by unfair and unscrupulous marketing
practices on the part of some dealers, which have been injurious to the new car dealers as a
whole, injurious to the car manufacturers, and bewildering to the purchasers of new cars. These
practices are what is called 'price packing' and misleading advertising. They have created chaos
and confusion in the market place.
Price packing is the practice of marking up or adding charges over and above the normal
recognized markup from the wholesale price at which a dealer purchases a new automobile
from a manufacturer. The pack in the price of a new car is, of course, offset by overallowances
on the trade-in value of the customer's used car. The effect has been to confuse the public and to
damage the automobile industry. Dealers who would like to do business on a fair, competitive
basis have been forced to use such tactics in order to stay in business. Confusion, doubt, and
suspicion have developed in the minds of the buying pubic which have retarded the sale of new
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statute and regulation, that corporate directors, officers, promoters or
employees disclose the costs of any property sold to the corporation.29
And some statutes require disclosure of cost for specific types of products
or services, such as automobile repair costs, 30 real estate closing costs, 31
and funeral goods and services costs. 32
Over the last half century the common-law approach to seller cost
or markup disclosure has come into increasing conflict with the federal
and state regulations. Our common-law traditions have held that infor-
mation about seller's cost should largely be irrelevant to a rational con-
sumer; in contrast, regulations at both the state and federal levels
implicitly recognize that markup misrepresentations can deceive buyers,
and in a few, limited markets, these regulations have required disclosure
of particular costs. Legislators and jurists both recognize that seller's
cost can play an important role in consumer determination of value and
have endeavored to acknowledge this fact.
The conflict between the old and the new law leads us to ask which
is right. We now strive to answer whether rational consumers should
care about seller's cost. Our answer: "It depends. ' 33 In the next Sec-
tion, we delineate market conditions that will cause consumers to value
or ignore markup information.
II. Do CONSUMERS VALUE MARKUP INFORMATION?
We begin by following Wittgenstein's advice: "don't think, but
look."' 34 Empirically, it is fair to say that at least some consumers in
some markets value markup information. In the retail car market, for
example, many consumers pay third-party services, like Consumer Re-
ports or Edmunds, for estimates of dealer costs. 35 In addition, the fraud
cars, and have set off a chain reaction adversely affecting the entire automobile industry, and, in
fact, our entire economy.
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2903.
29 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1989) (particularly 7 and 10, requiring registration
statements of all new securities and paragraphs 20, 21, and 25 of Schedule A, requiring disclosure in
the registration statements of all sales of property to the corporation; see also Item 302 & Reg. S-K
(17 C.F.R. §§ 229 etseq. (1989)); Forms 10Q & 10K and 13(d) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1988).
30 See, eg., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 9880 (West 1989).
31 See, eg., id. at 10,140, 10,236.
32 16 C.F.R. § 453.2. The funeral provider must furnish prices of certain products or services.
These include "the price of embalming, transportation of remains, use of facilities, caskets, outer
burial containers, immediate burials, or direct cremations .... Id. at 320-21.
33 This classic conclusion of legal scholarship can be found in many texts. Our favorite is Had-
dock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1449, 1467 (1986).
34 L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66, at 31 (G. Anscombe trans 3d ed.
1968).
35 Consumer Reports charges $11 for the first estimate, $9 for the second, and $7 for each addi-
tional estimate. It does not keep records of how many consumers use this service. Each Edmunds
book includes estimates of many types of cars (eg., foreign or compact) for a suggested retail price of
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cases already discussed are themselves anecdotal evidence that in some
settings buyers and sellers value information about the seller's costs.
Although most consumers of most goods do not attempt to obtain
markup information either directly from the seller or from third-party
sources, this fact by itself does not conclusively show that consumers
don't value cost information.3 6 Rather, the failure to ask for cost infor-
mation may itself be a product of other influences that dissuade consum-
ers from seeking such information despite its inherent value. For
example, the cost of third-party estimates may make services like Con-
sumer Reports' dealer cost estimates impractical for less expensive con-
sumer goods (like toasters). In addition, the fact that buyers don't ask
for markup information may be as much a function of the seller's unwill-
ingness to disclose such information. It would be rather futile, for exam-
ple, to ask a salesperson at Sears about the markup on a particular
item . 3 7
Explaining consumer silence by seller resistance is supported by a
recent study of Chicago car dealerships. Consumer-testers bargaining for
a new car asked salespeople about the dealership's true cost, among other
things. The test results affirm the hypothesis that sellers are unwilling to
reveal such cost information. 38 In every instance salespeople either re-
fused to provide cost information or gave an inflated figure for dealer
cost. Sixty-eight percent of the salespeople simply refused to provide the
cost information requested. In the remaining thirty-two percent where
salespeople did disclose cost, they inflated the figures an average of eight
percent, or $870, above the actual dealer cost. 39
$5.95 per book; approximately 186,000 copies were sold in 1989. Other third-party organizations
provide similar services to their members. For example, USAA, an association of current and for-
mer U.S. military officers, will provide estimates of dealer costs to its members for $8.95 per car.
Indeed, USAA even advertises a service that "negotiate[s] the best price" for a car at any dealership.
Anecdotal evidence from individual car dealers, however, suggests that fewer than 50% of car cus-
tomers have third-party information concerning dealer costs.
36 Of course, this fact also does not prove that they value markup information. Indeed, we
present a theory, infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text, that suggests that rational consumers will
rationally ignore or be indifferent to markup information in many markets. This is especially true
when consumers make repeated purchases of goods in "thick" markets with well-established spot
prices. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (definition of "thick" market).
37 Of course, it is unlikely that any salesperson at a store like Sears would possess cost informa-
tion, because of the structure of the store and sales process involved. As little or no bargaining is
done at a Sears, the sales staff would have little reason to know what the marginal cost or the
markup of the product is. This structure keeps such cost and markup information in the hands of
top management and prevents the sales help from revealing it even if they were so inclined.
38 As opposed to the earlier Sears example, car salespeople do possess the kind of cost informa-
tion useful to the consumer. Because automobiles are a classic "bargain good" in the consumer
market, salespeople must have access to and knowledge of cost information in order to formulate an
effective bargaining strategy. As such, it follows that in the new car market the failure to reveal the
cost information requested stems not from an inability, but rather an unwillingness, to do so.
39 Ayres, Fair Driving: Race and Gender Discrimination in New Car Sales, 104 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1991).
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Moreover, evidence from several markets suggests that the more
market power the buyer possesses, the more likely it is that the parties
will contract for markup disclosure. The monopsonist buyer, not having
to overcome any collective action problem, can bargain better than un-
concentrated groups of buyers. Often the first thing a monopsonist bar-
gains for is information about the seller's costs. Countries, for example,
have significant purchasing power in some product markets. When the
U.S. government solicits bids for government contracts, it requires bid-
ders to put down estimates of their cost.40 Similarly, member states of
the United Nations have joined together to force transnational drug com-
panies to disclose their markups as a prerequisite to bidding on state
contracts. 41
This is not to suggest empirically that all consumers would want
markup information in all markets. It is suggested, however, that
enough buyers expend real resources to learn about seller markups that
the common law's strong claim that markups are immaterial can be em-
pirically rejected. Our next task is to provide a theory to explain why
some buyers want to know the seller's cost.
A. The Irrelevance of Seller's Cost in Thick Markets
There is a certain logic in thinking that consumers would ignore the
seller's cost in determining the value of a good. Economic theory sug-
gests that a rational consumer would instead focus solely on whether the
good was worth the seller's price.42 Knowing the market price of similar
goods is crucial to assessing the good's worth because forgoing the
purchase of a similar product is an "opportunity cost" of making any
purchase. A consumer wouldn't want to a buy a good that she could buy
more cheaply elsewhere. The seller's historic costs can be irrelevant to
this "opportunity cost" inquiry when there are independent measures of
the good's market value. For example, in "thick" markets for homoge-
neous products a current market (or "spot") price will be readily avail-
40 Prime contractors must provide cost and pricing data to the federal government when submit-
ring contracting bids for government work. Truth-in-Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (1989).
41 Via the World Health Organization (WHO) and other multinational groups under the um-
brella of the United Nations (such as the United Nations Action Programme for Economic Co-
operation Among Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (UNAPEC), the United Nations
Action Programme For Essential Drugs (UNAPED), and United Nations Independent Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO), developing third world countries have attempted, sometimes success-
fully, to force transnational pharmaceutical companies to make bulk sales to the WHO and the
various agencies named above while disclosing cost, thus ensuring both pricing and quality effi-
ciency. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 60-84, U.N. Sales No. E.II.A.10
(1984).
42 Microeconomic theories of consumer choice suggest that rational consumers will form "reser-
vation" prices, which reflect their subjective value of a good, and will purchase the good whenever
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able. 43 In thick markets, therefore, consumers would not rely on seller's
costs as an indication of market value, because there are better, in-
dependent measures-namely, the market price. 44
A quintessential example of such a thick market, where seller's cost
should have no relevance, is the New York Stock Exchange. This insight
underlies the Efficient Capital Markets theory.45 The "weak form" of the
Efficient Capital Markets hypothesis predicts that past stock prices will
be unrelated to future changes in price. 46 Because all information about
past prices is reflected in the current market price (and indicates nothing
about future price changes), rational consumers would ignore informa-
tion about the seller's cost. It should be irrelevant to someone buying
IBM at $100 a share today whether the seller bought it for $50 or $150 a
share last week. Because the informational content of past prices is in-
corporated into the current price, knowledge of past prices is not valua-
ble to rational consumers in thick markets.47
There are other ready examples of thick markets which generate
well-defined spot prices. Commodities such as wheat, oil, gold, and any
other good traded on the New York Commodity Exchange or the Chi-
cago Board of Trade qualify as such goods. Product homogeneity and
sufficiently large numbers of buyers and sellers are prerequisites to mar-
ket "thickness." It is impossible to develop a thick market for non-
homogeneous goods, such as Persian rugs, because a spot price could
43 A thick market is one in which parties publicly trade so many homogeneous products that a
well-developed spot price is readily available. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES,
ANALYSIS & ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZA-
TION 143 (1975).
44 Consumers will have to compare their subjective value to the market price even in thick mar-
kets. But their subjective value of the good should normally be independent of the seller's. There-
fore, if seller's cost is going to be relevant to consumers, it will be through the nexus with
"opportunity cost."
45 See Fischel, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and Regulation of the
Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1041-1054 (1977); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, The Market for Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L.
REv. 1 (1978). In legal terms, information about seller's cost would not be material. This fact was
established by the Supreme Court in the context of securities trading. See TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) ("An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."). The immateri-
ality doctrine was reaffirmed in the Court's adoption of the "Fraud on the Market theory." See
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S 224 (1988).
46 Fana, Efficient Capital Markets A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
47 It should be noted that even in thick stock markets, the irrationality of chartism persists,
whereby some stock-market consumers quixotically attempt to predict future prices by charting the
past price cycles. R. BREALY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 260-61 (1981).
However, even if one rejects the Efficient Capital Markets hypothesis, see, eg., De Bondt & Thaler,
A Mean-Reverting Walk Down Wall Street, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1989), knowledge of a specific
seller's past price is immaterial because the historic spot price is available from other sources.
Knowing a specific seller's cost adds little over knowing what the stock in general was selling for that
day.
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never apply across goods. And the requirement of multiple transactions
insures that the spot price will continuously reflect changes in market
conditions. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of our thickest mar-
kets also have a sizable secondary market that even further increases the
effective number of buyers and sellers of the commodity.
Homogeneity and multiple transactions are necessary but not suffi-
cient conditions for market thickness. Returning to our automobile par-
adigm, we find that even relatively homogeneous products and numerous
dealerships do not insure a well-defined or readily available spot price for
new cars. Consumers pay dramatically different prices for the same car,
and need to invest significant amounts of time just trying to determine
what the "real" price is. 4
Consumers buy in retail markets that vary dramatically in their
thickness. Indeed, many products are sold to consumers in relatively
thin markets. Goods that consumers buy infrequently-such as con-
sumer durables-or goods which are inherently idiosyncratic-such as
houses and used cars-will often be traded in markets without well-de-
fined or readily available spot prices. Markets in which the good's price
must be bargained for-such as automobiles, electronics equipment, and
bicycles-are likely to be especially thin. 49
In thick markets, then, the common law correctly characterizes
seller's cost to be immaterial to rational consumer choice. However, the
common-law approach cannot be extended to thin markets. 50 We will
show that in thin markets rational consumers may rationally rely on rep-
resentations of seller's cost and, indeed, may have incentives to seek out
such information. 51
B. Markup Disclosure as Search Substitute
In a thin market-one in which a well-defined spot price is not read-
ily available---consumers will rationally investigate the prices of similar
48 See Jung, Price Variations Among Automobile Dealers in Chicago, Illinois, 32 J. Bus. 315
(1959); Stigler, Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961), reprinted in G. STIGLER,
THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171 (1968).
49 In a thick market, bargaining would be useless because no seller will sell at a price lower than
spot price, and no buyer will buy at a price higher than spot price.
50 There is some indication that judges in common-law cases are beginning to appreciate the
distinction between thick and thin markets. In FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987),
Judge James Logan found that a seller's misrepresentation was actionable in part because of the
uncertain value of the property. This diverges from earlier Oklahoma law in which the speculative
nature of the property was once the very basis for not finding reasonable reliance by the plaintiff
buyer.
51 Professors Haddock, McChesney, and Spiegel have suggested that legal rules should at times
turn on the thickness of the market. Haddock, McChesney & Spiegel, An Ordinary Economic Expla-
nation of Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REv. (forthcoming 1990); see also Ayres &
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goods. In other words, when a spot price does not exist, rational con-
sumers will try to create one.52 It is in just these situations that knowl-
edge of seller's cost can benefit the consumer. The seller's cost is
evidence of what the spot price for the good used to be, and thus, in a
thin market, may be a useful proxy in determining what the market price
currently is. 53
Knowledge of seller's cost can therefore enhance the efficiency of
consumer search by reducing the time spent on comparison shopping and
by increasing the effectiveness of any search undertaken. Seller cost dis-
closure reduces the search cost consumers must incur when they are
looking for a product. By knowing the cost to the seller, the consumer is
able to reduce her search cost by either substituting this information for
more search or by using it as a complementary tool to help her more
accurately evaluate the information the search generates. In either situa-
tion, the consumer gains.54
Seller cost will act as a substitute for actual search by the consumer
if it reveals to consumers the likelihood of finding a better price else-
where. For example, imagine that you are going out to buy a good that
you seldom purchase-let's say a diamond. You come to a store that has
just the type of diamond that you want, but you're unsure whether you
are getting a reasonably competitive price-and you are trying to decide
whether to visit other jewelry stores. If you knew that the store only
added a five percent markup on the diamond, you would be less likely to
search than if you knew that the store had added a fifty percent
markup.55  Examples like this dramatize the simple intuition that
markup disclosure can aid consumers by giving them some information
52 There is a rich economics literature detailing how long and how hard consumers will ration-
ally search for competitive prices. See, eg., Stigler, supra note 48. Consumers will undertake addi-
tional search at least as long as the marginal gain (of an expected lower price) is perceived to be
greater than the marginal cost (of going to another store).
53 Indeed, in the thinner market for over-the-counter stocks, the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers has promulgated a "5% markup policy," which prohibits securities dealers from resel-
ling a share of stock for more than a 5% markup. NASD Manual, par. 2151, § 1. See also R.
TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET 198 (5th ed. 1987). Limiting the dealer markup
reduces the investor's cost of interacting with dealers because they don't have to independently ver-
ify whether the dealer is trading at an artificially high price.
54 Through either the substitution or complementary effects, markup disclosure makes the con-
sumer more efficient in her product search and retains the reduction in search cost as a consumer
welfare efficiency gain. Search substitutes and search complements reduce consumer search by mak-
ing consumer product search more efficient. See Grady, supra note 5, at 226.
55 It might be that a 5% markup still represents an supra-competitive profit (for example, if the
competitive markup in the industry were only 1%). But the textual point is still correct that other
things being equal consumers will be less likely to search if they know there is a lower markup. As
emphasized below, see infra note 57 and accompanying text, consumers can often directly experience
the quality of the retail services. They do not evaluate the markup information "in a vacuum."
Given a certain amount of retail services, consumers will be better informed about how much to
search if they know the size of the retail markup. If consumers have received retail services that
should have cost the retailers 5%, they are much more likely to continue to search if they learn the
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on whether they have a good deal.56
This is not to say that five percent markups are always good deals.
Retailers incur expenses in providing valuable services to consumers, and
their markup on the diamond even in a competitive market will reflect
the cost of these services. 57 But in many situations, the retail services
will be a good that the consumers can directly experience. 58 Consumers
can feel the thickness of the carpet in the showroom, can see how well
dressed the salesperson is, and, in a sense, can gauge whether the markup
is justified by these retail services. 59 At an extreme, if someone tries to
sell a diamond out of the back of a truck, consumers should expect that
there will not be a very large markup in a competitive market.
Consumers may value markup disclosure because markup disclo-
sure transforms the retailer into the consumer's buying agent. Retailers
have a powerful incentive to purchase goods at the lowest wholesale
price. In that sense, consumers' and retailers' incentives are aligned:
both want the retailer to buy at the lowest wholesale price.60 Consumers
can partially rely on this unity of interest in evaluating markup informa-
tion. Since retailers have independent incentives to buy at a low whole-
sale price, consumers can rationally focus on whether the retailer's
markup is reasonably low or not.61
retailer is charging a 50% markup. If the consumers have received retail services that should cost
the retailers only 1%, then news of a 5% markup might spur additional search.
56 The disclosure of seller's cost may also act as a complement to the consumer search that does
occur. It may make the search more productive by giving the consumer a standard upon which to
gauge and evaluate her results.
57 We assume the seller's cost to be just the marginal cost paid for the individual diamond and
not any of the overhead costs, such as renting the retail space and advertising. See supra note 1.
58 Although the underlying product might be a search good, the retail services themselves may
be experience goods. For a description and discussion of the distinction between experience and
search goods, see Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. PoL. ECON. 729 (1974); see also Grady,
supra note 5.
59 Some retail services (especially those occurring after the sale-like warranty repair) may be
hard for consumers to experience at the time of sale. But reputational market constraints will
largely control the seller's provision of these services with or without cost disclosure.
60 Their interests diverge on the subsequent issue of how large the retail markup should be.
Retailers like a high markup; consumers like a low markup.
61 A rational consumer, however, would never completely rely on retailers to obtain the lowest
wholesale price, because the more consumers rely on retailers to buy at the lowest price, the fewer
incentives retailers will have to do so. If consumers focused exclusively on markup information in
making their purchasing decisions, retailers would have no incentive to search for the best deal
themselves. Thus, while markup disclosure may efficiently reduce consumer search, it may inef-
ficiently reduce retailer search-insofar as the retailers may believe that they can pass on a higher
wholesale price to the consumers as long as they do not excessively engage in markup of the retail
price.
The deleterious effects of this extreme reliance do not, however, undermine the argument that
markup disclosure can be efficient. As long as consumers don't focus solely on the markup, as long
as they continue to pay attention to the retail price and undertake some search in equilibrium, retail-
ers will retain strong incentives to search for the lowest wholesale price. This will be especially true
for products where the wholesale price does not vary dramatically across retailers. Many manufac-
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Consumer search is an almost inevitable by-product of rational
choice in thin markets. The "shoe-leather" costs of comparison shop-
ping are real costs borne by society. This Section has shown that knowl-
edge of markup disclosure is likely to reduce significantly the cost of
search by letting consumers know more objectively when they have a
good deal and can stop searching. Thus, in thin markets, consumers may
rationally value such information to make their search for the market
price more efficient. 62
C. Markup Knowledge Can Improve Consumer Bargaining Power
Rational consumers may also value markup information in markets
where they bargain over the sales price.6 3 In bargaining markets, knowl-
edge of a retailer's cost provides important information about how low a
retailer may be willing to go. Since a retailer cannot survive in the long
run if it sells goods at a loss, consumers realize that retailers will seldom
be willing to sell goods at less than their cost.64 Retailers may refuse to
go this low, but knowledge of seller's cost at least lets consumers know
when it is likely to be futile to continue bargaining. In this sense, markup
information serves a role that is similar to its effect on consumer search.
Just as markup information can tell consumers when it is time to stop
searching, it can tell consumers when it is time to stop bargaining. The
bargaining process itself can be seen as a type of intra-firm search by
consumers for the best price.
In economic terms, the equilibria of bargaining games often are a
function of each party's "threat point." The threat point is the price
above or below which a party would prefer not to contract. For example,
turers sell their products at uniform prices to retailers; the Robinson-Patman Act, in fact, places
legal constraints on selling to different competitors at different prices. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1989).
62 Victor Goldberg has proposed an additional reason why markup disclosure might be effi-
ciency enhancing. Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708(2), a consumer breaching a
purchase agreement may be liable to a retailer for the lost profits on the sale. If consumers do not
know what the lost profit is-here the size of the markup-they cannot appropriately estimate the
cost of exercising their option to breach and thus are likely to take inefficient precautions to avoid
the necessity of breach. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 283 (1984), reprinted in V. GOLDBERG, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 109 (1989).
63 Most retail goods are sold at "stated" prices that consumers leave or take as they like. For
example, it would be impossible for consumers to go into a McDonald's and bargain over how much
a hamburger costs. "Stated price" markets do not necessarily indicate a lack of competition; retail-
ers compete over the stated prices. Indeed, bargaining is inconsistent with a competitive thick mar-
ket. In thick markets, it would be irrational to bargain over a good's price because goods would
never be exchanged for more or less than the spot price.
64 There will be some exceptions. For example, if products are out of season or out of fashion,
then rational retailers may prefer to sell them at less than cost. Retail cost will not provide a perfect
indication of the retailer's rock bottom price, but cost information may still be relevant to the in-
quiry. Indeed, the bargaining motive is the likely reason that many automobile consumers investi-
gate the dealership's cost.
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the consumer's reservation price65 is the threat point above which she
would prefer not to purchase. Sellers analogously have a threat point
below which they would prefer not to sell. The Nash Solution posits that
bargaining games will lead to exchange at a price which is simply the
average of the buyer's and seller's threat points.66 It may, however, be
very difficult for the one party to learn the other's threat point. For ex-
ample, how would a seller learn what the buyer's reservation price is?
The Nash Solution also illustrates why each party will have an incentive
to misrepresent her threat point. Buyers will have every incentive to con-
vince the seller that they really don't value a sweater, say, at $100, so that
the exchange price will drop in the buyer's favor. When the seller is a
retailer who, to survive in the long run, must sell at a price that at least
covers its costs, the disclosure of those costs can provide powerful infor-
mation about the seller's threat point and thus can directly aid consum-
ers in extracting a larger percentage of the gains from trade.
The theoretical value of knowing retailer's cost has been borne out
in field experiments. Studies of new car sales have indicated that con-
sumers who appeared to know the seller's cost fared significantly better
in the bargaining process.67 It should be stressed, however, that this
"bargaining power" motive for ascertaining dealer cost has primarily a
distributional basis. If consumers armed with this cost information are
able to buy cars at a lower price, the economy is not necessarily more
efficient. The difference between a high and a low price represents to
economists simply a transfer of wealth and not an inefficiency. 68 Instead,
widespread cost disclosure may make bargaining markets more efficient,
by reducing the real costs of bargaining. 69
65 See supra note 42.
66 The Nash solution is defined more fully in G. OWEN, GAME THEORY 129-40 (1982).
67 See Cioldini, Bickman & Cacioppo, An Example ofConsumeristic Social Pyschology: Bargain-
ing Tough in the New Car Showroom, 9 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1979); Jung, supra note
45; Taylor & Dawid, Bargaining for a New Car: The Knowledgeable Versus the Naive Consumer, 59
PSYCHOLOGY REP. 284 (1986).
68 In the antitrust context, the higher price that consumers pay monopolists does not represent
any inefficiency in an economic sense. The inefficiency stems from those people that stop buying at
the higher price. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTrrRuST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 4-11 (1981).
69 Markup disclosure may not only shorten the length of the bargaining process, but may also
reduce the number of lost opportunities that stem from the incentives to bluff in bilateral bargaining
situations. The incentives of buyers and sellers to misrepresent their reservation prices and threat
points may cause the parties to forgo value creating exchange. In the earlier example, even if a buyer
values the sweater at $100 and the seller at $50, each may try to bluff the other party into thinking
otherwise. The buyer may try to bluff that she values the sweater at $60 and the seller may represent
that the sweater is really worth $70 to him. If this dual bluffing continues, the parties may fail to
contract.
Consumer knowledge of the retailer's markup undermines the retailer's ability to bluff because
the consumer has independent information about the retailer's reservation price. Thus, in the
sweater example, even if the buyer continues to bluff that the sweater is only worth $60, she is likely
to forgo a beneficial trade if she knows the seller's reservation price. Disclosing the markup gives at
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If all consumers were given information about seller's cost, there
would probably be a smaller dispersion of retail sale prices in bargaining
markets. Uniformly knowledgeable buyers would bargain to more uni-
form prices than buyers with different degrees of information about the
seller's markup. The primary distributional consequence of markup dis-
closure would thus be a more uniform sales price. This in itself might be
valued by society as a more equitable result. It is harder to predict, how-
ever, whether markup disclosure would lower the average price that con-
sumers pay-and thus redistribute wealth toward consumers. Several
studies have documented significant price dispersion across consumers
buying similar new cars.70 The very fact of persistent price dispersion in
retail car sales is inconsistent with perfect competition. Since no dealer
would want to sell below cost, the fact of a range of sales prices indicates
that the average price must be above the dealer's marginal cost.71 Thus,
there is room for competitive improvement-if cost disclosure increases
competition. Markup disclosure might well enhance market competition
by increasing the efficiency of consumer search. The decreased price dis-
persion might be accompanied by a lower average price-as the unin-
formed consumers that were paying high markups would bargain for a
lower price. A society that favored consumer protection might, on distri-
butional grounds, independently promote cost disclosure.
In sum, consumers may rationally value markup disclosure in thin
markets. A knowledge of the retail markup may make the search and
bargaining process more efficient. Cost information may also powerfully
affect the bargaining power of the parties. As a result, markup disclosure
would be valued by consumers for both efficiency and distributional rea-
sons. With the consumer value of markup disclosure in thin markets
now established both empirically and theoretically, the question arises as
to why the market is failing to respond effectively to consumer demand
for this information.
III. WHY THE MARKET FAILS TO PROVIDE SELLER COST
INFORMATION.
If consumers value cost information, our first intuitions are that
competition would encourage retailers to provide it. The simple compet-
least one party to the contract better information about the gains from trade (the difference between
the threat points), thus putting that party in a better position to judge whether the exchange can be
mutually beneficial.
70 See Ayres, supra note 39; see also Jung, supra note 48.
71 Competition may drive the average price to the dealer's average cost if the dealership incurs
certain fixed costs that must be amortized across different sales. If there are significant fixed costs in
retail services, then the high-price buyers may cross-subsidize the low-price buyers' share of these
fixed costs. See Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addys-
ton Pi'pe Case, 253 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982); Wiley, Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
556 (1987).
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itive story would be that any competitor that started to reveal its markup
could give itself a competitive advantage over its rivals. Other things
being equal, consumers would prefer shopping at stores that revealed
their cost, so that retailers who refused to reveal their markup would be
driven from a competitive market.
The reality of the marketplace, however, is strikingly at odds with
this simple competitive story. There are very few instances in which re-
tailers reveal their costs or markups. In the retail market for new
automobiles, for example, consumers are forced to go to the third-party
estimates of Consumer Reports or Edmunds. But such third-party cost
services cannot completely correct the market failure. First, it must be
much cheaper for retailers to provide this information. Retailers neces-
sarily and costlessly know the price at which they purchase goods.
Third-party services must expend real resources in investigating and im-
perfectly trying to verify their cost estimates. Second, consumers cannot
fully rely on the cost estimates of third-party services. Edmunds, for ex-
ample, disclaims on the first page of each of its publications that "[a]n
information and prices published herein are gathered from sources
which, in the editor's opinion, are considered reliable, but under no cir-
cumstances is the reader to assume that this information is official or
final." 72 The quality of this markup information is significantly reduced
by the fact that the third-party estimates do not include the hidden re-
bates (sometimes called "holdbacks") which manufacturers "kick back"
to dealers periodically for completed sales.73 Because third-party serv-
ices, like Edmunds or Consumer Reports, are more costly and less reliable
then direct markup disclosure from dealers, the existence of third-party
services can at best only mitigate the market failure to provide informa-
tion which consumers value.
In this Section, we suggest three reasons why retailer competition
might not lead to the disclosure of cost information: credibility disincen-
tives, first-mover disincentives, and bargaining disincentives. In some
markets, these disincentives may work in combination to preclude
markup disclosure.
A. Credibility Disincentives
Retailer competition will discourage revelation of markup informa-
tion if the costs of privately producing and then communicating the in-
formation is greater than the consumer value. The costs of privately
72 See, eg., EDMUNDS 1989 NEw CAR PRiCEs (1989).
73 Edmunds warns the reader that "[a] 'dealer holdback' and/or 'finance charge' is included in
the [base cost] of all domestically produced vehicles." Id. Remar Sutton describes the "holdback"
as "the two or three percent of the profit [that the manufacturer] 'holds back' from the dealer. The
dealer conveniently considers this a cost, since he actually pays the manufacturer this money. How-
ever, every three months or so, the [manufacturer] sends the dealer a check for all those two and
three percents." R. StrrroN, DON'T GET TAKEN EVERY TIME 79 (1986).
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producing the information are minimal. It is difficult to imagine that
retailers would sell a product without knowing what they paid for it.
Not having the information suggests an act of deliberate amnesia, since
the retailer must have been aware of its own costs at the time of
purchase. 74 The costs of credibly communicating this information to
prospective customers, however, can be sizable. The consumer must
have some reason for believing that the information is true for it to be
credible. In many instances, retailers can establish a reputation for hon-
est dealing that increases the credibility of representations about the
quality of their cars or the service they will provide. A reputation for
honest cost disclosure, however, is difficult for consumers to verify.
The legal system can play an important role in determining the cost
of credible communication. In the current legal system, fraudulent mis-
representations of cost are a common, if not accepted, advertising prac-
tice. Car retailers will routinely represent that they are willing to sell
their cars for $1 above their invoice cost, without revealing that the deal-
erships receive significant rebates from the car manufacturers so that the
invoice cost does not reflect true dealer cost. Such misrepresentations are
not limited to the car retail market. Examining the label of America's
largest selling beer, Budweiser, one finds what must be a clear cost mis-
representation: "We know of no brand produced by any other brewer
which costs so much to brew and age." Because Budweiser is not a pre-
mium-priced beer, the representation about higher cost, which has been
unchanged on the Budweiser label for years, is tantamount to representa-
tion of a low-if not the lowest-markup. Few consumers who give the
issue any thought would seriously believe that Budweiser beer costs the
most "to brew and age."'75
In Section I we argued that state and federal laws are beginning to
recognize that cost misrepresentations can be deceptive practices and
give rise to an action in fraud, but the reality is that consumer protection
agencies, such as the FTC, seldom prosecute such cases and common-law
courts continue to resist finding for buyers who have relied on misrepre-
74 Anthony Kronman has distinguished between deliberately acquired and casually acquired in-
formation. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 30-32 (1978).
75 Budweiser might defend itself by noting that it represents only that it "knows of no brand
produced" that costs more. It defies the imagination, however, that Budweiser could be so ill-in-
formed about its rivals. Alternatively, the Company might argue that when it speaks of the costs "to
brew and age," it is referring to the total costs of brewing all their beer and not the marginal cost per
can. Such an interpretation, however, would pass muster under current deceptive advertising laws
only if consumers understand the claim in these terms. If instead they interpret the claim to mean
that Budweiser makes less of a profit on each can of beer than other manufacturers do, and that
claim is false, then another manufacturer of beer could successfully charge Budweiser with deceptive
advertising under § 43a of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Budweiser's claim may also
run afoul of the Federal Trade Commission Act's prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices..." 15 USC § 45(a)(1) (1989); see also 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1989) (defining false advertise-
ments in connection with food or drug products).
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sented prices. 76 Under these current conditions, nonfraudulent retailers
face significant costs in disclosing their true markups. Because consum-
ers are accustomed to the fraudulently low misrepresentations of dishon-
est competitors, truthful disclosure can actually reduce demand.
Moreover, even in a world without cost misrepresentation, the costs
of effectively communicating can be significant if different retailers use
different methods of disclosing their costs. If some retailers include over-
head expenses, while others deduct manufacturer rebates, consumers will
be forced to compare disparate forms of markup information that will
reduce the effectiveness of any single disclosure. Consumers might then
value disclosure less for the simple reason that it will be harder to com-
pare with other dealers, and to develop benchmarks for comparison.
B. First-Mover Disincentives
Even in a world where the costs of credibly and effectively commu-
nicating markup information were negligible, profit-maximizing retailers
might still refuse to reveal their markups. Contrary to the basic tradi-
tional economic argument, disclosing retail markups might actually
reduce a retailer's demand. Under this scenario, there would be no com-
petitive incentive to be the first retailer to reveal markup information,
even if consumers valued this information.
One reason for this first-mover disincentive might be consumer mis-
interpretations. If consumers currently underestimate the competitive
retail markup, it is possible that being the first retailer on the block to
reveal the true markup could actually reduce sales. For example, if con-
sumers think that a reasonably competitive retail markup should be ten
percent, and the real markups actually range between twenty and thirty
percent,77 then even the lowest markup firm might lose business by com-
ing forward. The first retailer to "break the bad news" to the consumer
could actually induce more consumers to search away from its store than
if it remained silent. In the above example, consumers shocked by the
twenty percent markup might actually be more inclined to shop else-
where than if they had maintained their blissful ignorance.
In such situations, competitive pressure, if anything, will reinforce
retailers' decisions not to reveal their markups. The potential for con-
sumer misperceptions is exacerbated by the prevailing retailer practice
76 For a discussion of possible agency and judicial resistance to the proposals of this Article, see
infra note 95 and accompanying text.
77 The actual size of retail markup varies across the more specific markets for consumer goods.
A sampling of research in these markets revealed the following examples of retail markups: Auto
Parts (specifically catalytic converters)-300%, Stammer, EPA Cites 23 Muffler Shops in California,
L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at 3, col. 5; Pharmaceuticals-35-40%, Shaffer, Upjohn Expects to Sell
$100 Million worth of Rogaine in 1988, REtJTER Bus. REP., Oct. 13, 1988; Sporting Goods-40%,
FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 1982, at 84 (according to National Sporting Goods Association); Furniture-50-
60%, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 18, 1978; Levi's Blue Jeans-40-50%, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 10, 1975.
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and judicial acceptance of cost misrepresentation. Because cost disclo-
sures are frequently overstated, a retailer may paradoxically be put at a
competitive disadvantage by being the first to truthfully reveal what the
consumers wish to know.
C. Bargaining Disincentives
Retailers may also fail to reveal markup information if it puts them
at a bargaining disadvantage. As discussed above,78 possessing informa-
tion about markups may increase a consumer's bargaining power. An
important reason that automobile buyers want markup information is to
reap the inherent advantage that information provides; not surprisingly,
automobile retailers may resist revealing it for similar strategic reasons. 79
Sellers may prefer to keep consumers in the dark so that they can them-
selves bargain more effectively.80
One would think, however, that competitive pressures should over-
come this disincentive. Although the sellers collectively would prefer to
withhold markup information, individual sellers should be tempted to
reveal markups in order to increase their individual sales volume. We
suggest that this competitive result may not come to pass for both collu-
sive and noncollusive reasons.
Most directly, if retailers are collectively better off by not revealing
markup information to consumers, they may collusively agree not to re-
veal. The ability of retailers to collude will turn on several structural
variables in a particular market affecting the retailers' ability to reach
agreement on withholding markups, detect breaches of the agreement,
and effectively punish firms that breach the collusive agreement. 81 In the
retail automobile market, for example, while the number of retailers in
many metropolitan markets seems too large to support a collusive agree-
ment, the smaller number of car manufacturers might help organize and
support markup nondisclosure collusion. The manufacturers will poten-
tially gain from any strategy that increases the ability of the retailers to
price discriminate more effectively and thereby extract a larger portion of
consumer surplus, which can then be passed upstream via a higher
wholesale price.
Even where such collusion is not sustainable, there may be in-
78 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
79 Professors Haddock, Macey and McChesney, in the corporate takeover context, have argued
that seller resistance may be efficiency enhancing. See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property
Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987). Refusals to reveal
markup information are unlikely to enhance efficiency because, unlike the takeover context, such
refusals do not protect sellers' incentives to undertake value-enhancing investments.
80 From the seller's perspective, more effective bargaining is tantamount to more effective price
discrimination-as the retailer attempts to sell to each consumer at a price just below the consumer's
reservation price.
81 See Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM.
L. Rav. 295 (1987).
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dependent, noncollusive reasons that keep individual retailers from re-
vealing markup information in bargaining markets. In bargaining
markets, consumers buy similar products at different prices-the bar-
gaining process thus fosters a type of price discrimination which causes
some consumers to pay more for the same car.8 2 Independent retailers
may choose not to reveal markup information if they earn more from this
price discrimination with nondisclosure than they would from the higher
volume (but lower markups) if they disclosed.
Again returning to our paradigmatic automobile example, consider
the phenomenon of sticker sales. The sticker price of automobiles on
many new cars is more than $3,000 above the dealer's cost. Most auto-
mobile consumers pay substantially less than sticker,8 3 but a significant
percentage of sales are made at or near the sticker price.84 These
"sucker" sales may occur because consumers don't know it's a bargain-
ing market or dislike bargaining for a lower price.85 While researchers
often focus on price dispersion, it may be that the more important eco-
nomic variable is the concentration of profits which price dispersion gen-
erates. If ten percent of the dealer's sales represent fifty percent of the
dealer's profits, then dealers will rationally go to great lengths to seek out
suckers. If these sucker sales represent a significant portion of each deal-
ership's profits, the dealers may rationally and noncollusively decide to
withhold markup information. Markup disclosure would probably in-
crease the volume of cars sold, but it might drastically reduce the number
of sucker sales. It would be much harder in a markup disclosure world
to convince a consumer to buy at a few hundred dollars off sticker price
if the consumer knows that this price still entails a $2,000 profit markup.
Rational dealers may prefer to keep their lower-volume, high-profit
sucker sales rather than move to the more competitive high-volume equi-
librium that markup disclosure entails.
Thus, even though markup disclosure may reduce the consumer's
real costs of search and bargaining, retailers may strategically refuse dis-
closure. This refusal can be seen as a type of "rent-seeking" in which the
82 The persistence of price discrimination in a market is itself an indication that what economists
call "perfect competition" is not present. Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16
RAND J. EcON. 380 (1985). In perfectly competitive markets, all goods will sell at a single price
(equaling the seller's marginal cost). Nondiscriminatory sellers would drive out discriminatory sell-
ers by making nondiscriminatory and lower offers to the discriminated class.
83 Consumer Reports suggests that a $300 profit is reasonably competitive. However, there are
no published reports on the actual distribution or average markup. How to Get the Best Deal, CoN-
SUMER RP., Apr. 1986, at 211. Manufacturers undertake this research, but guard their data care-
fully. Telephone interview with G.M. marketing analyst, Marketing Division of General Motors
Corp. (July 1988).
84 R. SuTrON, supra note 73, at 37.
85 Some salesmen use the sexist term of "lay-downs" to refer to women who are willing to pay
the sticker or near-sticker price. Some classes of consumers may be forced to pay a near-sticker price
because salespeople systematically refuse to offer them lower prices. See Brown, Sexism in the Show-
room?, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1989, at Hl, col. 1; Ayres, supra note 39.
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retailers are willing to inefficiently reduce the total gains from trade to
get a larger piece of the pie.86
In sum, there are three primary ways in which disclosure disincen-
tives may work against the release of cost information in a given market.
First, credibility disincentives can preclude disclosure by raising the cost
of effectively communicating the information. Second, consumer mis-
perceptions can undermine the incentives of any firm being the first to
reveal this information. Third, the profitability of sucker sales in a bar-
gaining market can discourage noncollusive as well as collusive retailers
from revealing the size of their profits.
While these disclosure disincentives have been discussed separately,
they may work in tandem. As dramatically illustrated by the market for
new automobiles, retailers have reasonably come to the conclusion
that--even though consumers value the information-it is simply not
profitable to systematically reveal their true markups. Our broader thesis
that promoting markup disclosure can increase equity and efficiency does
not, however, necessarily turn on the persuasiveness of our disincentive
analysis. Even if the reader does not accept our theories of market fail-
ure, the fact of market failure still inheres in our theoretical and empiri-
cal arguments that some consumers want markup information, but
market competition fails to provide it.
Understanding the specific causes of market failure is, however, im-
portant. The appropriate legal response to promote markup disclosure
should flow from a particular theory of market failure. Diagnosing the
correct cause of market failure can thus lead to the correct legal cure.
The next Section accordingly examines a range of legal interventions that
are tied to the reasons that firms fail to disclose their markups.
IV. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES FOR PROMOTING RETAIL MARKUP
DISCLOSURE
In the face of this market failure, what is to be done? This Section
investigates a range of legal responses that promote markup disclosure
and therefore may improve the efficiency and equity of the market. Even
admitting market inefficiency, however, does not necessarily imply that
government intervention is cost-justified. Experience has shown that
many forms of government intervention can impose costs that are greater
than those of the unregulated market. 87 Thus, even in the face of market
86 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51 (discussing how contractual parties may refuse to disclose
value enhancing information for analogous rent-seeking reasons).
87 Regulated agencies, for example, can be "captured" by the very firms they are mandated to
regulate. Captured agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations. For a more de-
tailed description of administrative capture theory, see Peltzman, The Growth of Government, 23 J.L.
& ECON. 209 (1980); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EON. & MGMT. Sci. 3
(1971); Wiley, supra note 71.
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failure, we may still conclude that in the majority of markets, the legal
response should be to do nothing.
We propose that in a limited set of retail markets and with limited
forms of government intervention, the law can properly promote markup
disclosure. Our purpose here is to identify some of these specific markets
and the specific forms of appropriate intervention. Our central thesis is
that the form of government intervention in a given market should be a
by-product of the specific causes of market failure. The reason that re-
tailers fail to disclose their markups should dictate our policy response.
For example, when the unregulated market "artificially" increases
the costs of credible communication, legal intervention can promote
markup disclosure by simply making it cheaper to talk. Legal rules can
reduce the costs of credible communication in two distinct ways. First,
we discuss how prohibiting misrepresentation of retail costs can help re-
tailers credibly commit themselves to honesty. Second, we investigate
how setting standards for markup revelation may lower the costs of effec-
tive communication by providing consumers with a uniform benchmark
for comparison. Both of these legal responses do not mandate disclosure
but merely regulate the manner of any disclosure for which retailers may
opt. These legal rules create a more efficacious production function; the
good produced here is the information about the seller's costs. Prohibit-
ing misrepresentation and setting disclosure standards are both examples
of laws that reduce a particular type of transaction cost-the cost of
communicating the markup.88
As seen in the last Section, the failure of retail competition to engen-
der markup disclosure may not solely be attributable to the costs of cred-
ible communication. We argued that sellers in some markets would
refuse to reveal their costs even if it were costless to communicate. In
these limited markets we investigate a more intrusive form of govern-
ment intervention: mandatory disclosure.
As we have stressed, many regulations are not worth the cost.
Policymakers should be especially sensitive to the market response to
government intervention. Retailers may attempt to resist the regulation
by nullifying cost disclosure, they may attempt to exploit the regulation
to facilitate collusion, or markup competition may distort retailer and
consumer behavior in ways that significantly reduce the appropriateness
of such legal intervention.
A. The Least Intrusive Intervention: Making Markup
Misrepresentation Actionable
Market competition will only cause information to be revealed when
the costs of communication are less than the consumer's value for the
88 Reducing informational costs of transactions will facilitate trade. See Gilson, Value Creation
by Business Lawyers Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
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information. The market can fail to provide information that consumers
want if the cost of this information good is greater than its value.
If the marketplace of ideas is completely unregulated, it can become
quite expensive to speak credibly simply because rational listeners will
discount the speaker's veracity. Allowing speakers to lie with impunity
engenders a linguistic form of Gresham's law89 in which dishonest
speech drives out the honest speech by making it more costly.90 One
speaker's dishonesty imposes an externality on all other speakers, making
it harder for all other speakers to be heard.91
Making fraudulent misrepresentation actionable promotes value-
creating trade. 92 Being susceptible to civil liability for misrepresentation
allows speakers to more credibly commit themselves to honesty. The
contingent nature of this liability for lying can drastically reduce the cost
of communicating in a way that consumers will believe. In effect, every
communication carries with it a postscript: "Cross my heart and hope to
pay civil damages if I'm lying."
While federal regulations and some common law precedents make
cost misrepresentations de jure illegal, the de facto enforcement practices
of the FTC and its state counterparts leave consumers largely unpro-
tected. The simplest and least intrusive government intervention would
be:
(1) to explicitly overrule the common law of the precedents suggesting that
misrepresenting seller's costs is immaterial to rational consumer choice;
(2) to promulgate FTC regulations making it even more explicit that mis-
representations of retailer's cost or markups would be an actionable decep-
tive trade practice under the Federal Trade Act;93 and finally,
89 Sir Thomas Gresham hypothesized that "bad money drives out good." R. LIPsEY, P.
STEINER & D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 624 (1984).
90 Opportunism drives out trade-and fraud is an extreme form of opportunism. Courts occa-
sionally refuse to enforce fraudulent contracts or allow damages therein in the effort to undermine
the use of contracts deemed against public policy. See, ag., McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures
Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 166 N.E.2d 494, 199 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1960) (allowing defendant to rescind
opportunistically illegal contract); Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal. App. 2d 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846
(1967) (allowing plaintiff to recover opportunistic secret milk kickback).
91 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store Inc., 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689
(1957). In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to enforce a retailer's offer of fur coats
"worth up to $100" for "$1 each," thus making it more difficult for other retailers to persuade
consumers to rely on their offers as their confidence in such representations was eroded. To the
extent that consumers cannot distinguish between bona fide offers from fraudulent offers to sell
"$100 dollar fur coats for $1" or to sell cars "for $1 over dealer invoice" then consumers will tend to
disbelieve all offers. It will be harder for honest sellers to compete on the basis of how big their
markup is.
92 The process of trade or exchange creates value by allocating goods to higher-value owners. If
I own a sweater which I value at $30 but which you value at $40, then any contract price by which I
sell you the sweater creates $10 of value.
93 Alternatively, the FTC could simply begin to enforce the existing regulations prohibiting de-
ceptive trade practices, as argued supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. Such regulations, how-
ever, are ambiguous and past practice has failed to notify sellers that misrepresenting markups is
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(3) to promote both public and private enforcement of these fraud or decep-
tive trade standards.94
Strengthening the legal response to fraudulent misrepresentations of
seller's cost would promote markup disclosure by lowering the cost of
credible communication. 95
B. Promulgating a Disclosure Standard
Implicit in making markup misrepresentation actionable is the idea
that courts will need to distinguish between what is truthful and what is
not. The judiciary will be forced into the business of setting legal stan-
dards for what constitutes truthful disclosure. In some situations, how-
ever, the law can properly take a more active role in establishing the form
and manner of markup disclosure. Courts deciding whether a particular
representation is fraudulent will focus primarily on the truthfulness of
the representation. The law can importantly affect the cost of disclosure
by regulating its veracity and form so that it is more readily understood
by consumers and more useful to consumers in comparing alternative
markups.
Promulgating regulatory standards for how markups are to be cal-
culated and disclosed would make markup disclosure more meaningful.
Requiring uniformity in the calculation and disclosure of markups might
make it easier for consumers to understand or compare different retailers.
Without such regulated uniformity, retailers might remain truthful but
obfuscate the form of their disclosure to make it meaningless.9 6 Consum-
ers would be forced to evaluate disparate markup measures, making it
harder for them to determine what the competitive markup should be.
potentially actionable. Accordingly, it is more appropriate for separate rulemaking to clearly articu-
late the boundaries of a violation.
94 An especially effective way to empower consumer groups would be to give such groups legal
standing to use testers to audit and enforce substantive disclosure standards. Such standing, for
example, is available in fair housing cases to testers seeking to uncover discriminatory trade prac-
tices. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
95 Of course, it is possible that the same structural forces that have kept regulatory agencies and
the courts from prohibiting markup misrepresentation could keep them from enacting or enforcing
even this least intrusive policy alternative. A crude public choice theory might, for example, predict
that concentrated sellers (such as automobile dealers) are more likely to capture regulatory decisions
than diffuse consumer interest groups. There are two answers to such arguments. First, the propos-
als in this Article are directed toward what the law should be, not what necessarily is implementable
by the body politic. Second, by demonstrating that markup disclosure could improve the equity and
efficiency of certain markets, this Article may mobilize public interest groups and publicly minded
regulators to re-examine past practices. Common law judges, for example, might change their view
that it is unreasonable to rely on seller representations even in "thin" markets.
96 Obfuscation is a time-honored tactic. Unregulated insurance contracts, for example, were
often "printed in such small type, and in lines so long and so crowded, that the perusal of [them) was
made physically difficult, painful, and injurious. Seldom has the art of typography been so success-
fully diverted from diffusion of knowledge to the suppression of it." Delancey v. Insurance Co., 52
N.H. 581, 588 (1873).
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For many retail items, the simplest and most useful cost standard to
use would be the transfer price paid to the manufacturer-that is, the
marginal cost at the retail level. Calculating marginal cost at the manu-
facturer's level is often a difficult and imprecise process; in antitrust pred-
atory pricing cases, courts and academics have long struggled to find a
workable standard for estimating this species of marginal cost.97 At the
retail level, however, it is much easier to calculate marginal cost. In
many retail contexts, the marginal cost of a product simply consists of a
direct payment to the manufacturer. 98 It may be difficult, in other
words, to calculate the manufacturer's marginal cost of producing a fro-
zen pie, but it is relatively straightforward for a retail grocer to reveal
how much it paid the manufacturer for a pie.99 In some retail markets,
this type of marginal cost accounting would be more difficult and, as
discussed later,1°° high-markup retailers might be expected to intention-
ally restructure their production to circumvent or undermine the disclo-
sure standards. But, even taking into account this market resistance,
uniform standards for revealing cost or markup information can dramat-
ically spur competition in this new dimension of product "quality."
Manufacturers able to speak credibly about their costs may begin to com-
pete for consumers on the basis of markup size.
The pro-competitive effect of setting uniform standards is seen in
other areas of consumer protection. Recently, the federal government
began to collect information about airline time performance on individ-
ual routes. Before this government action, it was exceedingly difficult for
punctual airlines to communicate information about their superior
service to the public. Carriers could cite different statistics about their
on-time record, but it would be difficult for consumers to compare these
disparate representations. The uniform reporting standard, however, has
spurred a great deal of advertising about on-time performance. The car-
riers that are more punctual than their competitors are explicitly capital-
izing on government standards in their advertising.101
97 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 322 U.S. 29, 34-35
(1963); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977); E.B. Mullen
v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1984); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.)
Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHi.
L. REV. 506, 515-23 (1974); Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON.
129 (1972).
98 Other costs of retail "production" such as advertising, rent, and other overhead expenses are
largely fixed and consequently do not affect the marginal cost of sales. Although some retail costs
(such as a salesperson's time in selling a car) are properly included in a complete measure of margi-
nal cost to avoid retailer manipulation, a simple standard of revealing the amount paid to the manu-
facturer is the easiest to calculate and least subject to abuse.
99 See Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. 685.
100 See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
101 For example, refer to American Airlines' $25 million advertising campaign pushing its "On
Time Machine" advertising slogan in 1988. American is clearly taking advantage of the Department
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This standardization effect is also demonstrated in the area of gov-
ernment labeling and grading of fruits, vegetables, and other consumer
grocery items. 0 2 The simple grading of produce and other grocery items
triggered a new form of retail competition. It increased the efficiency of
consumer search for these goods by transforming experience goods (con-
sumers could not see inside a can of tomatoes) into search goods by re-
vealing to consumers the quality of the product before they buy it.103
Government grading created an objective standard of quality that in-
creased the efficacy of consumer search.
In a wide range of retail markets, regulatory structures already exist
that could be used to enforce cost disclosure standards.104 The FTC Con-
sumer Protection Division, which already supervises the regulatory re-
quirement of uniform quality disclosure, could begin to oversee an
industry's compliance with cost disclosure standards. An excellent ex-
ample appears once again in the automobile industry. In this industry,
consumer protection legislation already exists, on both a state and federal
level, that requires dealers to list items such as the manufacturer sticker
price and transportation costs. 10 5 The additional costs of enforcing uni-
form markup disclosure would be marginal.
Markup standards would not force retailers to talk. They would
regulate the manner of disclosure only if retailers chose to talk. Retailers
would opt for disclosure only if it was to their advantage to comply with
the standards and disclose their markup. If for some reason the stan-
dards make effective disclosure more costly, little is lost because few re-
tailers currently disclose their cost. There would be minimal chilling
effect of regulation because there is currently so much silence. Thus,
while promulgating standards for the form of cost and markup disclosure
is more intrusive than merely outlawing dishonest disclosure, it is un-
likely to reduce the amount of disclosure. On the other hand, if promul-
gating disclosure standards lowers the cost of effectively communicating,
then the standards by themselves may engender more markup disclosure
and the attending benefits of equity and efficiency.
of Transportation's new time performance statistics to gain a nonprice competitive advantage in the
industry. See ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 9, 1988, at 24.
102 For government standards on foods in general, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (1989); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 101, 130-169 (1989).
103 See Burck, Plain Labels Challenge the Supermarket Establishment, FORTUNE, Mar. 26, 1979,
at 70.
104 See, eg., The Automobile Information Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1233 (1988); The
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq. (1988); certain weights and measures
acts such as those pertaining to the labeling of foods in 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (1988).
105 15 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1238 (1989). It might also be desirable to regulate the method of optional
disclosure. For example, if a dealer chooses to reveal its markup, federal or state regulation might
require that it be included as a term of the sales contract or as an item on the sales sticker. Regulat-
ing the method of disclosure is similar to the used-car "lemons" regulations, which mandated that
dealers specify whether the car was sold with a warranty or "as is." In this context, regulation might
require the dealer to state whether the car was sold with markup disclosure or not.
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C. The Possibility of Targeted Mandatory Disclosure
The economic case for mandatory disclosure of retailers' costs or
markups is harder to make. As we have argued, using the law to reduce
the cost of communication should be sufficient to induce retailers to pro-
vide markup information when consumers value it. Once a regulatory
standard is established for truthfully disclosing markups, individual re-
tailers should, in many instances, be tempted to reveal their cost in order
to gain a competitive advantage. Again, the argument is that consumers,
ceteris paribus, would prefer to buy from a retailer who certified a maxi-
mum markup level on all items in the store. Others retailers would then
be forced to follow suit. The end result would be an equilibrium of vol-
untary cost disclosure throughout the market.
Indeed, one could argue that going beyond voluntary disclosure
might reduce social welfare. Requiring cost disclosure when the costs of
communicating are higher than the value of the information to consum-
ers would force retailers to provide a service whose value is less than its
cost. It is hard to imagine, however, that the costs of markup disclosure
are high. Retailers inherently know the price at which they bought. 0 6
Even if mandatory markup disclosure was established in a thick mar-
ket-the kind of market in which consumers do not value markup infor-
mation-the direct social loss would be minimal.'0 7
In Section III, we discussed two reasons why retailers might not
voluntarily reveal information even when there was a cost incentive to
communicate. Consumer misperception about the size of competitive
markups might actually put a retailer at a competitive disadvantage by
revealing the markups. In such cases, retailers might collectively want to
reveal their markups, but no individual retailer wants to be the first to
disclose.10 8 And, as argued earlier, retailers in a bargaining market may
refuse to efficiently reveal their markup to maintain a better bargaining
position.
Under such circumstances, retailers will not reveal cost even if fraud
actions and disclosure standards make the costs of credible and effective
106 The cost of mandatory markup disclosure would therefore be similar to the negligible costs for
lenders in disclosing the interest rate under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1604
(1982). See Donohue & Ayres, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the Unthinkable, 39
STAN. L. REV. 791, 802 (1987) ("These costs [of disclosure] are minimal: Few institutions lend
without knowing the annual interest rate, so the marginal cost of disclosure amounts to about the
cost of the ink used in printing a 2-digit number.").
107 But see infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of indirect losses that might be
occasioned by legal intervention.
108 The retailers collectively might be better off if markups were disclosed because consumers
would ultimately have more confidence in the markup (and would have to undertake less inefficient
search). Industry sales might even increase. The inability of competitors to co-ordinate socially
beneficial innovation is found in other areas of economics. See Farrell & Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985) (when innovation creates social benefits
which are external to individual firms, competition may not produce innovation).
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communication negligible. Mandatory cost disclosure may thus be the
only way to produce socially valuable information. Again, however, the
form of government intervention should be tied to the type of market
failure. 10 9 Mandatory markup disclosure should be used only when the
market is failing for reasons unrelated to the costs of communication. In
these cases retailers will not voluntarily move towards a cost disclosure
equilibrium. The specific causes of market failure detailed in Section III
may be misspecified or incomplete. The larger question for efficiency-
minded lawmakers, however, is to ask what retailers would do in a world
of costless disclosure. If they would still refuse to disclose socially valua-
ble information, then mandatory disclosure is warranted.
The new car market serves as a paradigmatic example. Even with a
clear disclosure standard, it is unlikely that retailers would volunteer to
reveal their markups in the bargaining process. Consumers value this
information and inefficiently pay third parties for estimates of informa-
tion that the retailers readily have available. In such situations, the law
may need to give the market equilibrium a nudge. Armed with markup
information, consumers would bargain for more uniform and arguably
lower prices. Moreover, the process of searching and bargaining for a
car would become much less time-consuming and costly. Mandatory
disclosure requirements might accordingly improve both the equity and
efficiency of such targeted markets. Markup disclosure for new cars
could easily be included on the federally mandated price sticker." 0
The proper ambit of this mandatory intervention would be quite
limited. Many markets are sufficiently thick so that consumers do not
value information about seller's cost. Moreover, when seller's cost is val-
ued, encouraging voluntary disclosure with uniform standards will often
be sufficient. For this reason, the prudent course of action in even the
automobile market might be to stiffen penalties for fraudulent disclosure
and to promulgate clearer disclosure standards. Mandatory disclosure
could then be used as an intervention of last resort, when the market
continues to fail to provide information that consumers patently
desire. 111
In tailoring specific legal responses, policymakers should be attuned
to the costs of implementing either mandatory or voluntary markup reg-
109 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51 (theories of contractual incompleteness should inform
how efficiency-minded courts set contractual defaults).
110 Markup disclosure might also relate to other aspects of buying a new car-including extended
warranties and financing. Although consumers often do not bargain for these nontangibles, they
represent pure retail products that dealers buy at ascertainable prices and mark up in selling to
consumers.
111 As emphasized above, supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text, the existence of third-party
services (like Consumer Reports and Edmunds) may mitigate but cannot eliminate the inefficiencies
stemming from retailers' failure to disclose. In some circumstances, however, the mitigating effect of
third-party markup services might make them a better alternative than mandatory disclosure, given
its costs of administration and socially inefficient resistance.
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ulations. We now examine how the market is likely to respond to legal
interventions in ways that may seriously mitigate their usefulness.
D. Market Resistance
In implementing any of the foregoing legal attempts to encourage
markup revelation, policymakers should evaluate how market partici-
pants are likely to respond to specific forms of government intervention.
In particular, regulators should be aware of how retailers may try to stra-
tegically manipulate disclosure standards to their benefit."t 2 This Section
examines a number of different types of retailer resistance to markup reg-
ulation. In some instances, the cost of resistance will negate the benefits
of regulations. Being aware of the forms of resistance, however, can en-
courage policymakers to structure regulations which minimize the op-
portunities for such strategic manipulation.
1. Vertical Integration. -- One way that industries may attempt to
undermine cost disclosure standards is by vertical integration-merging
manufacturing and retail production into single corporations. In indus-
tries where retailers are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the manufacturing
company, it is much harder to estimate marginal cost. Vertically inte-
grated firms may manipulate the price at which they transfer goods from
the manufacturing unit to the retailing unit. By artificially increasing
this transfer price, the retailer could claim a low markup and thereby
gain a competitive advantage. Indeed, encouraging markup disclosure
might for this reason induce retailers to merge with manufacturers.
Requiring markup disclosure might nevertheless be appropriate. In
situations where a manufacturer is partially integrated-where, for ex-
ample, a manufacturer sells some of its product through wholly-owned
retailers and some through independently-owned retailers-it might still
be possible to force the wholly-owned retailers to represent an accurate
wholesale price. Integrated sellers could be forced to disclose the whole-
sale cost to their unintegrated retailers. This would, in all but the most
completely integrated markets, ensure the reliability of the disclosed cost
information and maintain its usefulness.
The difficulties of estimating marginal cost for integrated firms are
112 Some standards for cost accounting can easily be adopted from generally accepted accounting
principles to aid in cost disclosure. For example, in times of inflation, retailers will have an incentive
to adopt a LIFO (last-in-first-out) accounting basis to measure the marginal costs of their inventory
and exploit the increased cost of newer inventory. LIFO accounting (in contrast to FIFO (first-in-
first-out)) will lead to a higher marginal cost number in inflationary times as the retailer's cost for the
most recently purchased products will obtain. LIFO accounting will accordingly reduce the size of
the retailer's markup-making the retailer's price seem more competitive. For a basic description of
LIFO and FIFO accounting methods, see H. SELLIN, ATrORNEY'S PRACTICAL GUIDE TO Ac-
COUNTING 5-30 to 5-35 (1965). However, if a uniform standard is set or if retailers uniformly opt for
the same accounting basis, then comparable cost data will be generated. Many other features of
standard accounting principles will work to provide similarly useful cost data.
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real. In some markets a large degree of vertical integration (or induced
vertical integration) would militate against markup disclosure interven-
tion. Still, it is unlikely that requiring markup disclosure would cause
General Motors to merge with the hundreds of its independent dealer
franchises throughout the country. 113 Even if vertical integration were
complete, it might be possible in some industries to still develop informa-
tive accounting principles for estimating marginal or unit costs. As dis-
cussed above, 114 it is more difficult to calculate marginal costs for
manufacturers than for retailers. But evolving accounting principles-
informed by historical practice and the costs of unintegrated competi-
tors-might resuscitate the utility of cost disclosure even in integrated
industries. Vertical integration increases the difficulty of calculating a
true marginal cost, but there still remain many markets in which in-
dependent retailers refuse to reveal readily known cost information.
2. Manufacturer Rebates. -Manufacturer rebates also increase the
difficulty of estimating marginal cost. In the new car market, U.S. manu-
facturers routinely give back to dealerships "rebates, bonuses and incen-
tives" based on the number of cars sold in a particular sales period. The
rebates can amount to two or three percent of the dealership's initial
cost.1 5 Thus, the dealership's true cost for a car is the amount originally
paid the manufacturer (the dealer's invoice) minus the amount the manu-
facturer subsequently rebates to the dealership. Standards for markup
disclosure would have to account for such rebates.
Establishing such standards would be difficult but not impossible.
While retailers would have an incentive to underestimate the expected
rebate to inflate their marginal cost estimate, 116 they could be forced to
accurately disclose such expected rebates and include shortfalls in future
periods much as is done with estimated taxes. A regulatory movement
toward mandatory disclosure may also induce car manufacturers to in-
113 It is possible that retailers could create dummy corporations to buy from the manufacturer
and sell to the retailer at an inflated price. This practice would deflate the markups of the down-
stream retailers. While this example shows that regulations would need to be particularly sensitive
to the circumvention efforts of retailers, it would be fairly easy to eliminate this specific type of
evasion by forcing retailers to reveal the markup based on the costs of whomever first buys from the
manufacturer. By basing the dealer's cost on this first transfer price, a regulation could eliminate the
incentives for sham "middlemen" corporations that provide no valuable services-while allowing
consumers to directly judge whether post-manufacturer profits are justified by post-manufacturer
services.
114 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115 See L SrrroN, supra note 73, at 195.
116 In the new car market, dealers as the buyers of trade-ins have an additional incentive to
underrepresent to the used car seller the price at which the dealer will subsequently sell the car ("I
will only be able to resell your car for $500"). The analysis of this Article, however, might be
extended to the trade-in market. An analogous regulation, for example, might require a dealer to
reveal to the used-car seller the intended resale price for the car-and then require the dealer to
actually offer the trade-in at that price for a specified period (perhaps two weeks).
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crease the extent and complexity of rebate programs to undermine the
workability of markup disclosure regulation. Responsive regulation
could, however, limit these strategies. Fines could be introduced for sys-
tematic underestimation; unaccounted rebates could by law be passed on
to the consumer; or firms could be forced to allocate unaccounted rebates
to reduce their cost estimates on future sales. 117
3. Induced Collusion. -Another problem may arise if cost disclo-
sure induces collusion among retailers. The benefits of markup disclo-
sure would be seriously reduced if disclosure induced or facilitated such
activity. Public disclosure of retailers' costs might make it easier for re-
tailers to reach and enforce a collusive agreement in that they could more
rationally decide how to divide the market and assess the incentives of
individual retailers to breach an agreement. 118 Policymakers should
therefore assess the likelihood that cost disclosure would facilitate collu-
sion. In many retail markets, however, retailers already have knowledge
about their competitors' costs. Only the consumers are in the dark.' 9
In such situations, promoting cost disclosure would have a negligible im-
pact on retailers' ability to collude.
Returning to the example of the car market, there is strong reason to
believe that the net effect of cost disclosure would be pro-competitive.
The high cost of bargaining for cars at individual dealerships dramati-
cally reduces the amount of competition among different dealerships. A
rational salesperson knows that it will be difficult for any consumer to
visit more than a small number of dealerships-since it currently takes
more than an hour per dealership to find out the "real" price. Thus, even
though there may be several dealerships in a city, an individual dealer
knows that any customer in its showroom is likely to visit only a few of
its competitors. These high bargaining costs serve to divide up the mar-
ket and give individual dealerships local monopolies (or oligopolies) over
the potential customers in their showroom. Markup disclosure, however,
serves not only as a substitute for search, but reduces the cost of further
search at other dealerships. 20 Thus, markup revelation is likely to place
117 A tricky issue remains about what part of a rebate is attributable to an individual car. If the
monthly rebate program is "progressive," then the final cars purchased in the month have larger
implicit rebates (the size of the marginal rebate is increasing). Indeed, this may explain why dealer-
ships are often inclined to give better deals at the end of the month. R. SuToN, supra note 73, at
197.
118 To collude successfully, firms in an industry must be able to reach agreement, detect breaches
of the agreement, and punish firms that breach the agreement. The disclosure of information about
retailers' costs might be a "facilitating practice" that make collusion easier. See Ayres, supra note
81, at 316.
119 For example, car dealers can get estimates of their competitors' costs simply by buying an
Edmunds manual. See supra note 35.
120 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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individual dealerships into actual competition with a larger group of
dealerships and therefore heighten competitive rivalry.
4. Distorted Consumer Competition. -Finally, mandating stan-
dardized disclosure may distort market behavior by both consumers and
sellers. If the standards are only imperfect proxies for product quality,
then consumers, relying on the standard, may mistakenly choose inferior
products. Manufacturers may in turn exacerbate this distortion by alter-
ing their products in ways that satisfy the standard but actually reduce
product quality.121 For example:
the [Recommended Daily Allowance (RDAs)] were devised on the assump-
tion that, by obtaining the RDA of major nutrients from natural sources,
we would also obtain sufficient amounts of trace elements. However, manu-
facturers have responded by fortifying natural products with synthetic vita-
mins, so that the assumed relationship between major and trace nutrients
may no longer hold. As a result, products which score well may not be the
products which are most nutritious on balance.122
Supply-side distortions of this kind have arisen in connection with a
number of ill-conceived disclosure standards.1 23
Promulgating standards for markup disclosure may similarly act to
distort market behavior. On the demand side, if consumers pay more
attention to the size of the markup than to the price of the product, re-
tailers will have less incentive to search for the best wholesale price. At
the extreme, retailers would not invest any resources in lowering the
price they paid manufacturers, confident that they could pass on any
price to consumers as long as they kept their markup sufficiently low.
Further, consumers focused on the size of the markup might begin
to ignore the quality of retail services. Retailers forced to compete on
markup size might be forced to unduly scrimp on the fixed costs of retail
production. Low-volume products that necessarily have higher inven-
tory costs might be driven from the market and retail services that were
not reflected in the seller's marginal cost would be limited.
In each of these examples, misinformed consumers may rationally
make inefficient choices that induce inefficient seller behavior. The threat
of consumer distortion may not be great because a knowledge of the sale
price gives consumers a backstop measure of value. Rational consumers
would not be mesmerized by markup disclosure and forget about either
the actual sale price or the value of retail services. Because consumers
121 See generally Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J.L. & ECON. 491, 525 (1981).
122 Id.
123 It is possible that cigarette manufacturers, in an effort to reduce tar and nicotine content
(which must be disclosed), have failed to reduce carbon monoxide levels and hence the total toxicity
of cigarettes. Id. Thus, "to the extent that consumers rely on the index (at the expense of other
data), sellers will seek to maximize their rating at minimum cost namely, by improving only those
attributes given the most weight in the index." Id.
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can directly experience the quality of many retail services, 124 higher
markups that are related to higher retail services (including higher retail
inventory costs for specialized, low-volume products) should not deter
consumption. However, it is only honest to concede that since consumer
ignorance and misperception can cause an unregulated market to fail,
these same traits might serve to undermine or distort "enlightened" mar-
ket intervention. Policymakers should accordingly be attuned to the real
world consequences of markup disclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a limited set of markets, consumers value markup information.
Notwithstanding this fact, most retailers refuse to disclose it. The failure
of the market to provide consumers with information about the seller's
cost inefficiently increases the costs of search and inequitably increases
the amount of price dispersion among consumers. We have argued that
the law can improve the equilibrium in these markets by encouraging
markup disclosure.
In a pragmatic way, our analysis suggests which markets should be
the targets of government intervention. Policymakers should first look at
the "demand" side to identify markets in which consumers will particu-
larly value markup information. We have suggested that a knowledge of
the seller's cost will only be relevant in "thin" markets-markets in
which consumers would rationally search for information about the mar-
ket price. Policymakers can identify thin markets in several ways. First,
such markets will often be characterized by price dispersion (different
retailers will sell the same good at different prices). Second, markets in
which consumers bargain over the selling price are necessarily thin. Fi-
nally, and most directly, one can look to see the extent to which consum-
ers actually search for information about the best price among retail
competitors. Consumer search will be most likely if consumers only in-
frequently purchase a product or if the product is sufficiently heterogene-
ous that spot prices will not develop.' 25 In such thin markets consumers
will value markup information as a substitute for search. A consumer
offered a product five percent above retailer's cost is less likely to con-
tinue searching than a consumer who has an offer with a fifty percent
markup.' 26
In his path-breaking article The Economics of Information, George
Stigler noted that "[p]rice dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it
124 See discussion supra note 58 and accompanying text.
125 Consumers need to search for Persian rugs, for example, because although they are largely
substitutes, they are sufficiently heterogeneous that uniform pricing would not obtain.
126 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (a discussion of how consumers relying on directly
observable information concerning retail services can use markup information to guide length and
intensity of their search).
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is the measure of ignorance-in the market." 127 Stigler was speaking
about market price ignorance: consumers won't buy from one manufac-
turer if they know they can get a better deal elsewhere. One contribution
of this article, though, is to show that knowledge about a retailer's
markup can serve as a proxy for knowledge about the market price.
After identifying markets in which consumers will rationally value
markup information, regulators should next look to the "supply" side to
determine why retailers fail to provide this information. We have argued
that the type of regulatory intervention should be tied to the specific
causes of market failure. In many instances, the costs of credibly and
effectively revealing markup information will keep retailers from passing
on this information to consumers. The current practice of many car
dealerships to offer to sell cars "$1 above their invoice" cost is especially
persuasive evidence of this type of market failure. Dealers obviously
think this type of information is relevant to consumers' purchasing deci-
sions or they wouldn't emphasize it in their advertising.1 28 But the ac-
cepted practice of lying about dealer's cost makes it much more difficult
to tell the truth. Consumers discount all markup representations so that
a dealership revealing a higher truthful markup may actually put itself at
a competitive disadvantage. In such markets, outlawing markup misrep-
resentation and establishing uniform standards for voluntary markup dis-
closure may, by itself, be sufficient to engender markup disclosure.
Some retail markets, however, may fail to disclose markup informa-
tion for reasons unrelated to the costs of credible and effective communi-
cations. Retailers in bargaining markets may particularly prefer to
withhold information about the size of their markup in order to get a
bigger piece of the pie. If a significant proportion of the consuming pub-
lic fails to bargain aggressively, retailers in a bargaining market may pre-
fer to retain their "sucker" sales rather than move to an equilibrium with
less price dispersion. In these situations, mandatory disclosure require-
ments may be necessary to bring about markup revelation.
This Article has focused on the new car market as a prime target for
regulatory intervention. But other markets might benefit from markup
regulation. For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,129 a consumer
bought a combination refrigerator-freezer from a retailer for $1145.88
and then refused to pay the full contract price. At a trial for the unpaid
balance, the plaintiff-retailer "admitted that cost to the plaintiff corpora-
tion for the appliance was $348.00."130 The trial and appellate courts
127 Stigler, supra note 48, at 213-14.
128 A similar argument undermines Richard Posner's contention that borrowers do not value
information about the interest rate. See Donohue & Ayres, supra note 106, at 802 n.50 ("[T]he
widely advertised interest rate competition among car manufacturers is prima facie evidence of the
informational value in disclosing interest rates.").
129 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, rev'd, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
130 Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
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struggled to determine the proper remedy for this unconscionable 325%
markup. 131 We suggest, however, that fewer contracts of this kind would
be written in the first place if consumers knew the size of the markup. At
minimum, markup disclosure will tend to reduce price dispersion by
driving out unconscionably high markups. 132 The Reynosos would have
been less likely to buy the refrigerator-freezer if they had known the
seller's cost. The Frostifresh example suggests that retail markets in
which "shady" sales practices lead to extortionary markups may be addi-
tional targets for mandatory markup regulation. 133
Ultimately, these regulations may engender a form of markup com-
petition in which retailers affirmatively attempt to attract consumers on
the basis of low markups. Credible commitments to low markups could
assuage at least one consumer fear-the fear of being ripped-off by a
middleman. 134
Finally, this Article has attempted to address some of the real diffi-
culties in implementing the various markup regulations. The very forces
that make unregulated retailers reluctant to reveal markups are likely to
induce regulated retailers to resist markup regulation. Retailers may try
to obfuscate and circumvent markup regulation by offering rebates or by
vertical integration. Consumers may unduly emphasize markup infor-
mation over other indicia of product quality (including retail services and
even retail price). But notwithstanding these difficulties of implementa-
131 The court fretted, "Does the court have the power under § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code to refuse to enforce the price and credit provisions of the contract in order to prevent an
unconscionable result?" Id. at 759; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51.
132 High markups may be necessary to provide products on credit to consumers who are poor
credit risks. Restricting the ability of sellers to charge higher prices will make them less willing to
sell to poorer credit risks and such restrictions might ultimately hurt those very consumers that the
laws are attempting to help.
Our proposals do not-unlike usury laws-restrict sellers from charging high markups. They
merely require sellers to reveal the size of the markup to the consumers. If paying a higher implicit
interest rate is in the best interest of higher risk consumers, they should be willing to sign even once
the high markup is revealed. By claiming that markup revelation will drive out unconscionably high
markups, we are implicitly claiming that many of the high markup concerns are driven not by credit
risk considerations, but by the seller's ability to take advantage of consumer (markup) ignorance.
133 Regulators might want to target "tin men"--door-to-door aluminum siding salespeople. See
Tin Men (Touchstone Pictures in association with Silver Screen Pictures 111987); see also American
Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964) (contract for installation of
"Flint-Coat" siding with markup of 300% held unconscionable).
134 Thin markets can also exist for goods that consumers buy relatively frequently. Consumers,
for example, regularly buy groceries, but supermarkets sell so many different items that it is difficult
for consumers to retain detailed comparative knowledge about the best price for 40,000 different
goods. Some supermarkets respond by advertising the "lowest weekly food bill." See Note, Ratio-
nalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 120 n.50 (1985) (by Ian Ayres). Markup
competition might more credibly allow consumers to search for the best price. Unit pricing that
included markup information would let consumers better assess whether their preference for one-
stop shopping should outweigh an unusually high markup on a particular item. Supermarkets might
more rationally commit to selling no good at more than a 10% markup.
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tion, the benefits from markup disclosure are grdat. The frustration that
many consumers experience in buying a car is largely attributable to the
ludicrously inefficient manner in which cars are marketed. 135 A targeted
policy toward promoting markup disclosure could, in a small way, im-
prove our quality of life. For the sake of efficiency, disclosure might re-
duce the amount of time consumers need to bargain and search for a car.
For the sake of equity, disclosure might reduce the chance that consum-
ers would be caught paying outrageous markups. This strong conver-
gence of equity and efficiency argues in favor of considering legal policies
which promote markup disclosure.136
135 See, eg., Tin Men, supra note 133 (Richard Dreyfuss bargains for a Cadillac and salesperson
will not reveal the best price).
136 Richard Posner noted:
Social welfare legislation... is usually thought to involve a tradeoff between equity and effi-
ciency, or between the just distribution of society's wealth and the aggregate amount of that
wealth. If... equity and efficiency line up on the same side of the issue, these laws are consider-
ably less problematic than they have seemed to some observers.
Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513, 513 (1987).
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